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When Elites Forget Their Duties: The Double-Edged
Sword of Prestigious Directors on Boards
Jana Oehmichen, Daniel Braun, Michael Wolff and
Toru Yoshikawa
University of Goettingen; University of Goettingen; University of Goettingen; Singapore Management
University
ABSTRACT Previous research indicates that the performance effect of prestigious directors is
ambiguous. Our study addresses this issue by integrating the theoretical lens of board capital
and the institutional perspective. We argue that prestigious directors can bring beneﬁts as well
as costs. We claim that the emergence of these costs depends on the institutional context,
speciﬁcally the institutional characteristics of the country’s corporate elite circle which is
characterized by the elite cohesion and the elite exclusiveness. Our empirical results with a
15-country sample covering the period of 2005 to 2014 provide evidence for the overall
existence of a positive performance effect of prestigious boards. However, our results also
indicate that these beneﬁcial effects of prestigious boards are mitigated in countries with high
elite exclusiveness. Hence, under these certain institutional conditions, the elite-favouring
behaviour of prestigious directors also brings costs.
Keywords: corporate elite, corporate governance, director network, institutions, prestigious
directors
INTRODUCTION
The effect of board characteristics on ﬁrm performance has been a major focus of many
studies in recent decades (Combs et al., 2007; Kor and Mahoney, 2005; Peng et al.,
2003). The efﬁcacy of directors’ impact on ﬁrm performance is generally based on how
the directors perform their board tasks, namely, providing advice and counsel (Forbes
and Milliken, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lynall et al., 2003), monitoring manag-
ers (Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Kroll et al., 2008; Mizruchi, 1983; Pearce and Zahra,
1991), and providing legitimacy in the factor and product markets (Hillman et al., 2007;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The efﬁcacy of directors usually depends on their human
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and social capital or director capital in general because it affects the directors’ capability
to fulﬁl their monitoring role and/or to play a resource provision role (Hillman and Dal-
ziel, 2003). Prestige of an individual director is one type of director capital that may
have an important effect on ﬁrm performance.
Prestigious directors can beneﬁt companies immensely as they provide legitimacy
(Certo, 2003) and access to social capital (Boivie et al., 2012), and they can be a relevant
source of power for the board of directors over the management (D’Aveni and Kesner,
1993). However, researchers have started questioning whether prestige can also be detri-
mental (Pollock et al., 2010) and have addressed the potential cost of prestigious direc-
tors (Acharya and Pollock, 2013). Prestigious directors form a country’s economic or
business elite, which is deﬁned as the best or choice part of a larger group (The Concise
Oxford Dictionary, 1990), or speciﬁcally, the choice part of the business community in
this study. Often, corporate executives and board directors of large ﬁrms belong to this
group, and we contend that the afﬁliation with these elites can inﬂuence the directors’
behaviour. For example, such afﬁliation may lead to elite-favouring behaviour such as
nepotism between directors and managers, which may mitigate directors’ vigilant moni-
toring, although such behaviour is rarely in a company’s best interest.
Researchers have shown that elite networks of directors shape countries’ business sys-
tems (Scott, 1991; Useem, 1982) and often set the rules and shape the norms of the busi-
ness world. The identiﬁcation with the elite may cause them to behave in favour of the
elite even at the expense of other stakeholders due to their motivation to support other
elite members and/or to remain in this circle by conforming to the elite norms. At the
same time, prestigious directors are endowed with rich director capital such as extensive
social capital and access to valuable information and external resources, which can be
leveraged for the ﬁrm’s interests. Hence, the presence of prestigious directors on the
board can be either detrimental or beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm. We thus explore competing
arguments to predict the performance implication of prestigious directors.
To disentangle the potential beneﬁts and costs of prestigious directors and resolve the
competing arguments, we introduce an institutional view on elites and treat some insti-
tutional factors as important contingencies. We argue that elite structures are societal
phenomena that emerge at the institutional level and hence, our study also focuses on
institutional-level characteristics that likely affect the efﬁcacy of a country’s elite. Our
view is that the performance effect of prestigious directors is contingent upon the char-
acteristics of elite structure, speciﬁcally the degree of elite cohesion and exclusiveness.
When the cohesion of the elite is strong, i.e., elite members are concentrated among a
small number of individuals, elite-speciﬁc norms and rules as well as proprietary infor-
mation spread more effectively, as cohesive networks improve the consensus about the
norms (Westphal and Khanna, 2003) and facilitate their diffusion (Davis et al., 2003).
Such structures likely motivate prestigious directors to choose behaviours that preserve
or enhance the beneﬁts of the elite group sometimes at the expense of the focal ﬁrm’s
other stakeholders. Elite exclusiveness can lead to the formation of an elite group com-
prising of members from a similar social class background, which tends to lead to com-
mon understanding of appropriate behaviours and norms (Davis and Greve, 1997) that
are sometimes distinct from those of external members of the elite circle. This exclusivity
limits the diffusion of these norms beyond the elite’s borders and thus may facilitate
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unobserved behaviour that favours the elite group of prestigious directors. Thus, the
exclusivity of the elites catalyses the implementation of the elite-speciﬁc rules and norms
of prestigious directors. Both cohesion and exclusivity of the elite group, therefore, likely
have negative moderating effects on the prestige–performance relationship.
By investigating these questions, our paper makes three important contributions.
First, our study extends the concept of prestigious directors by adding the institutional
lens. We discuss how institutional-level characteristics of elite structures, i.e., cohesion
and exclusiveness, shape prestigious directors’ behaviour and thereby affect the balance
of costs and beneﬁts of such directors. By connecting the ﬁrm-level effects of behaviour
of prestigious directors to country-level institutional characteristics, we show how our
research can provide deeper insight through the integration of the micro- and macro-
level perspectives. Second, our study contributes to comparative corporate governance
research. Prior studies examine the impact of board or director capital in single country
contexts (e.g., Diestre et al., 2015; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Tian et al., 2011). Our
conjecture is that the effect of director capital likely varies by institutional context, as the
way in which some dimensions of director capital inﬂuence directors’ behaviour or ﬁrm
outcomes is inﬂuenced by a local institution in which each director (and each board) is
embedded. Third, we contribute to research on the effects of prestigious directors from
a perspective of director capital. While prior board research examines the impact of var-
ious types of board capital, this study focuses solely on directors’ prestige, thereby show-
ing one of the key dimensions of director capital in depth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss previous litera-
ture on the potential beneﬁts and costs of prestigious directors. On the basis of this
review, we develop two competing hypotheses regarding the overall performance effect
of prestigious directors who have additional directorships or executive positions in large
companies. Then we analyse the two institutional dimensions of the country-level elite
structure that can affect the likelihood of these costs to be ampliﬁed. This is followed by
a description of our data and methods and our empirical results. We conclude with a
discussion on theoretical implications and a future research agenda.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Previous research suggests that board capital has important implications on a ﬁrm’s stra-
tegic behaviour (e.g., Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Oehmichen et al., 2017a, 2017b;
Pugliese et al., 2009; Tuschke et al., 2013) and ﬁnancial outcome (e.g., Johnson et al.,
2013; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; McDonald et al., 2008). According to Hillman
and Dalziel (2003), board capital is the sum of individual director’s human and social
capital. While each individual directors have various experiences, expertise, and exter-
nal ties that make up their own capital, prestige is one dimension that sets one director
apart from other directors as it has many advantages, yet it is often difﬁcult to obtain.
The focus of this study is the performance impact of prestigious directors.
Prestige is based on the relationships and afﬁliations of corporate actors (Boivie et al.,
2012). For example, the afﬁliation with prestigious parties is advantageous for ﬁrms as it
enables them to gain the respect of, or simply impress, potential exchange partners in
their environment, such as customers, investors, and other stakeholders (Chen et al.,
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2008; Perrow, 1961; Pollock et al., 2010). Researchers have identiﬁed directors, in addi-
tion to top management team members (D’Aveni, 1990; D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993), as
an important source of ﬁrm prestige (Certo et al., 2001). Directors are especially prestig-
ious when they have sustainable personal relationships with important individual mem-
bers in the ﬁrm’s environment. However, how these prestigious[1] directors occupying
board positions in large ﬁrms affect ﬁrm performance remains an open question.
Beneﬁts of Prestigious Directors
Resource dependence theory offers several explanations for why prestigious directors
have a positive performance effect. In order to carry out their advice and counsel func-
tion effectively, directors must have access to critical external resources (Hillman et al.,
2007; Lynall et al., 2003). Such access is often facilitated by their relations to the exter-
nal environment. Those external relations can be treated as the directors’ social capital
and prestige based on directorships and executive positions in important ﬁrms (Boivie
et al., 2012). Ties to other important entities in a ﬁrm’s external environment generate
board social capital in the form of valuable relations to key stakeholders and industry
incumbents, which allows the ﬁrm’s management to access their resources (Adler and
Kwon, 2002; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian et al., 2011). Ties to important ﬁrms
(‘high status’ ties according to Shropshire, 2010, p. 254) are especially relevant for
knowledge transfers through board members’ additional directorships because the status
increases the directors’ ability and inﬂuence to diffuse knowledge (Shropshire, 2010).
Hence, we argue that prestigious directors with directorships and executive positions in
other large ﬁrms represent a critical resource channel for those directors to offer quali-
ﬁed advice and counsel, thereby positively affecting performance.
Additionally, prestigious directors have a considerable signalling effect (Acharya and
Pollock, 2013; Certo et al., 2001) and also provide ﬁrms with important legitimacy
(Certo, 2003). For instance, prior research has shown that prestigious directors are posi-
tively associated with higher IPO valuations (Pollock et al., 2010) and, accordingly, neg-
atively associated with IPO underpricing (Certo et al., 2001). D’Aveni (1990) found a
comparable signalling effect of prestige in his analysis of manager appointments, show-
ing that ﬁrms appoint prestigious managers to prevent bankruptcy because such manag-
ers help to maintain the support of creditors. However, legitimacy is important not only
for investors’ or creditors’ valuations but also for ﬁrms’ relations with other key stake-
holders, such as suppliers and customers (Hillman et al., 2008; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978), as legitimacy sends a signal to those stakeholders that the ﬁrm is a reliable trading
partner. In summary, the increased legitimacy acquired through prestigious directors
increases a ﬁrm’s success in capital and factor markets and thus has a positive effect on
ﬁrm performance.
Besides enabling access to resources and legitimacy, prestige is an important source of
power (D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993). For example, prestige is one of Finkelstein’s (1992)
power dimensions. He argued that ‘an important source of power is personal prestige
(or status)’ (Finkelstein, 1992, p. 510). The power of directors likely has two effects. First,
it increases the directors’ external inﬂuence (relative to the power of the companies’
stakeholders), and therewith, the ﬁrms’ reputation and standing, and ultimately, the
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ﬁrms’ bargaining power in the market (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Sec-
ond, it increases the directors’ internal inﬂuence relative to the power of the CEO,
allowing those directors to engage in more effective managerial monitoring (Combs
et al., 2007). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), for instance, argued that ﬁrms make use of
powerful directors to buffer the effects of environmental uncertainties and to increase
the exchange of information. Similarly, board members who are more powerful than
the CEO can better inﬂuence the dismissal of underperforming CEOs (Flickinger et al.,
2016) and the appointment process of future board members (Westphal and Zajac,
1995). Thus, with more prestigious directors, boards are able to fulﬁl their tasks more
effectively, which, in turn, affects ﬁrm performance positively.
Based on these arguments, we propose our ﬁrst hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Prestigious boards have a positive effect on ﬁrm performance.
Potential Cost of Prestigious Directors
While our discussion above focused on the positive effects of prestigious directors on
ﬁrm performance, the presence of those directors may have some downsides. The
research suggests that prestigious directors with directorships or executive positions in
other large ﬁrms belong to an elite’s inner circle (Acharya and Pollock, 2013; McDonald
et al., 2008; Mills, 1956), and this afﬁliation can affect the directors’ behaviour.
Researchers have identiﬁed the following common behavioural patterns of elite mem-
bers. First, the members of the elite group carefully guard their own status (Acharya and
Pollock, 2013). Second, the elites tend to be subject to homosocial reproduction. Elite
members use the power associated with their status to appoint directors who are similar
to themselves (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Zhu and Westphal, 2014), which could limit
diversity within the elite circle. Once an individual has reached a high status position, he
or she can more easily realize the advantages of additional high status positions and pro-
motion (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Chen et al., 2008; Schaubroeck and Lam, 2002)
because of the homophilous behaviour among elites; similar personal attributes have a
strong inﬂuence on the appeal between individuals (McPherson and Smith-Lovin,
1987). Third, the research has shown that the members of an elite tend to help each
other in both strategic (McDonald and Westphal, 2010) and personal matters (McDo-
nald and Westphal, 2011). In short, prestigious directors may be motivated to act in the
interests of other members in the elite circle and also share similar views with other elite
members including executives, which can lead to a lack of diversity and potentially less
innovative decisions.
These behavioural patterns can result in prestigious directors taking actions that are
not necessarily in the interest of the ﬁrm or its stakeholders: they follow similar behav-
ioural patterns, potentially stiﬂing innovation or radical change, and hence they can
potentially damage ﬁrm performance. For instance, prestigious directors might have
close social ties to executives (Westphal and Khanna, 2003) and fear the loss of reputa-
tion and exclusion from the elite circles as a result of strictly monitoring these elite mem-
bers (Westphal and Stern, 2007). In such a case, prestigious directors’ monitoring of
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executives may not be as strict and effective as the monitoring of non-prestigious direc-
tors. In order to support other elite members, including the CEO, prestigious directors
may also bring in business practices through their interlocking board positions that ben-
eﬁt the CEO but not the shareholders. Due to the shared values and norms, those direc-
tors may not be able to challenge ineffective strategic proposals made by the CEO. In
short, while board ties often facilitate the diffusion of new business practices, prestigious
directors may be motivated to spread practices that are in the interests of executives and
themselves. Indeed, prior studies show that social ties can result in less strictly bargained
executive compensation contracts (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Westphal and Zajac, 1995),
a higher probability of option backdating (Bizjak et al., 2009), and fewer CEO dismissals
due to poor ﬁrm performance (Flickinger et al., 2016; Nguyen, 2012). Hence, having
more prestigious directors on board reduces the boards’ efﬁcacy. Hence, we propose the
following opposing hypothesis to Hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis 1b: Prestigious boards have a negative effect on ﬁrm performance.
Although the potential positive effects of prestigious directors and their actions that
reﬂect their elite favouritism at the expense of other stakeholders may co-exist in
any institutional context, the extent to which such beneﬁts or costs prevail may vary across
institutional environments. We contend that relative effects are likely inﬂuenced by an insti-
tutional environment with certain characteristics. In the next section, we will shift the level
of our analysis from the ﬁrm to the institutional level and examine how the institutional
elite structure moderates the performance effects of prestigious directors.
Institutional-Level Elite Structure as a Moderator
The rules and norms of a society emanate from the institutional environment (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983). Institutions can inﬂuence ﬁrm behaviour by determining what is
legitimate (Moore et al., 2012). Thus, institutions establish what are referred to as the
‘rules of the game’ (Moore et al., 2012; North, 1990; Peng et al., 2003; Wan and Hoskis-
son, 2003). Since elite members, including board directors, are embedded in a nation’s
institutional environment, it is expected that their behaviour will be affected by the insti-
tutional norms and rules. However, the institutional context varies by country. Interest-
ingly, prior studies have already revealed that the efﬁcacy of social capital varies across
countries (Burt et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2009) and that institutions inﬂuence resource
dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Given these base arguments, to further our
understanding of how directors with high prestige can affect ﬁrm performance in differ-
ent country contexts, the institutional perspective must be integrated into our theoretical
model. Additionally, the elite characteristics that affect the elite-favouring or self-serving
behaviour of prestigious directors are a societal phenomenon. Therefore, we examine
this phenomenon at the institutional level.
Our argument is that the elite structure in a country emanates from institutional char-
acteristics that shape how these elite members relate to each other as well as to non-elite
members and how these elite members are reproduced. We contend that the degrees of
cohesiveness and exclusiveness of the elite circle are important contingencies that
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inﬂuence their behaviour, which in turn affects the performance implications of prestigi-
ous directors. Speciﬁcally, we argue that greater degrees of elite cohesiveness and exclu-
siveness will negatively moderate the effect of prestigious directors on ﬁrm performance.
Elite cohesion. An efﬁcient elite is characterized by a cohesive network of its members—
also often called the ‘small world’ (Cohen et al., 2007; Nguyen, 2012). We contend that
prestigious directors’ behaviour and its effects are inﬂuenced by the extent of elite cohe-
sion or the degree of concentration of corporate elite members, and that the impact of
such behaviour could have important performance implications. We argue that direc-
tors’ behaviours that serve the interests of the elite are facilitated when the elite members
closely share norms and interests and can easily reach a consensus about these norms
within a small circle of elite members. Prestigious directors in countries with such cohe-
sive elite structures are likely better informed about the elite norms and interests as the
dense network of directors represents an efﬁcient information channel. The members of
a cohesive elite meet often and can share their worldviews and observe their codes of
honour (Davis et al., 2003; Mills, 1956).
Prestigious directors’ behaviour is likely inﬂuenced by cohesive elites not only because
they share elite-speciﬁc rules and norms but also because their deviant behaviour would
likely be more easily detected by other members in a small cohesive circle, which may
lead to social sanction. For example, in cases of defection from the rules of the elite, the
elites use social distancing to punish non-compliant members (Westphal and Khanna,
2003). Social distancing in the case of directors includes ‘acts of avoidance and snubbing
as neglecting to invite directors to informal board meetings, not asking their opinion or
advice in formal meetings, not acknowledging or building on their comments in discus-
sion, and engaging in exclusionary gossip whereby board members talk about other peo-
ple and events with which the focal director is not familiar’ (Westphal and Khanna,
2003, p. 365). Although prestigious directors may face fewer sanctions for deviation
from the elite norms than less prestigious directors (He and Huang, 2011; Westphal and
Khanna, 2003), a cohesive elite structure likely mitigates this tendency since greater
cohesion means fewer opportunities for a deviant director to obtain other elite positions
due to the small world structure.
This elite cohesion among directors often emerges through individual directors occu-
pying multiple directorates in different ﬁrms and the resulting ties between individual
directors (Mizruchi, 1996). Several studies have indicated that different kinds of business
practices are diffused across ﬁrms through networks created by shared directorates (Biz-
jak et al., 2009; Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Haunschild, 1993). For example,
Haunschild (1993) showed that directors imitate the practices of other ﬁrms when they
sit on those ﬁrms’ boards. More speciﬁcally, Davis and Greve (1997) found that directors
use their social networks to spread business practices such as poison pills. Similarly,
Bizjak et al. (2009) showed that the practice of option backdating could also spread
through the director network. Thus, these prior studies indicate that the normative
understanding of business practices spreads through the director network, and the diffu-
sion is likely more efﬁcient in a dense network.
Greater elite cohesion can have negative effects on the performance impact of prestig-
ious directors. When elite members are connected in a highly cohesive elite structure,
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they are likely to be able to share elite norms and behavioural expectations more efﬁ-
ciently. As discussed earlier, due to the fear of exclusion from the elite circle, prestigious
directors are unlikely to attempt to intensively monitor senior executives, who usually
belong to the same elite circle. This tendency can be ampliﬁed in a small circle due to
more efﬁcient information ﬂow and limited opportunities for other elite positions. This
implies that executives of even poorly performing ﬁrms may not receive much scrutiny
or punishment from the board. Further, those directors may be willing to accept busi-
ness practices that favour elite members even at the expense of shareholders and other
stakeholders because of their incentives to advance the elite members’ interests and also
to avoid social exclusion. For example, members of the cohesive elite might be willing to
support stock option backdating for executive compensation packages because they
have become used to this practice within their elite network.
While such elite-favouring behaviour may have a negative performance impact
because prestigious directors do not engage in managerial monitoring and rather facili-
tate the diffusion of business practices that could damage the interests of shareholders
and stakeholders, we could argue that such behaviour might lead to a positive perform-
ance effect when those directors’ motive to support other elite members is aligned with
the ﬁrm’s and shareholders’ interests. In addition to managerial monitoring, directors
often engage in providing resources that are valuable to the focal ﬁrm (Hillman and Dal-
ziel, 2003). Prestigious directors’ incentives to conform to the elite norms in a small elite
circle, thereby supporting executives who also belong to the same circle, can also facili-
tate their resource provision role as a board member. For example, when the CEO of
the focal ﬁrm is facing pressure from shareholders to improve ﬁrm performance, prestig-
ious directors in an environment characterized by cohesive elite structures may be more
willing to play a resource provision role by giving advice to the CEO and/or bringing in
external resources that help improve ﬁrm performance (McDonald and Westphal,
2010). Therefore, the elites’ incentives to support each other may positively impact
performance.
However, such positive effects are likely to be realized only under speciﬁc condi-
tions, e.g., when CEOs are facing pressures from investors or competitors who do not
share the same elite norms. Even then, it is possible that elite members can support
each other by ﬁnding ways to evade such pressures, e.g., by working with afﬁliated
block shareholders or friendly ﬁrms to dampen pressure from arm’s-length investors
or competitors, rather than directly responding to the market demands. Hence, pres-
tigious directors’ resource provision may not always have performance enhancing
effects.
In summary, we argue that a cohesive elite network likely enhances the potentially
negative performance effects of prestigious directors. Due to strong and clear elite-
speciﬁc norms and the threat of social punishment, prestigious directors in these coun-
tries have a stronger motivation to act in favour of the elite, which may likely end up
hurting the interests of the ﬁrm’s other stakeholders. Therefore, we have the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The cohesion of the corporate elite has a negative effect on the rela-
tionship between prestigious boards and ﬁrm performance.
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Elite exclusiveness. Another institutional-level factor that can inﬂuence the impact of pres-
tigious directors on ﬁrm performance is elite exclusiveness. While the elite cohesion
affects directors’ behaviour through their interactions or relationships with other mem-
bers in a small elite circle, elite exclusiveness inﬂuences their behaviour not only through
their relationships with other elite members but also through their relationships with
external groups or individuals outside the elite circle. Being exclusive implies having a
clear distinction between in-group members and others. The more exclusive a country’s
elite circle is, the better its members can keep their behaviour private from the scrutiny
of non-members outside the circle. While the elite tends to create its own normative
understanding of business practices, such elite-speciﬁc norms and best practice rules can
persist in exclusive elite structures because the boundary between the elite and external
world is not very porous when the extent of exclusiveness is high. As a result, the out-
group members can neither observe nor mimic these practices easily; in other words,
elite members can determine within their inner circle which behaviour is appropriate
(Davis and Greve, 1997). This exclusivity also defends them from any institutional mim-
icking of their norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and thus protects the stability of the
elite structure.
We argue that countries’ elites can protect their exclusiveness by allowing as little
mobility between social classes as possible. In this way, the members of the elite always
belong to the same social class. The similar social class background beneﬁts the informa-
tion ﬂow among the elite members. Researchers who have examined the aspect of infor-
mation ﬂows within the small world phenomenon have shown that greater social
distance can restrict social communication (Milgram, 1967). Within a corporate gover-
nance context, this means that contacts from similar social settings are particularly inﬂu-
ential in ‘transporting’ business practices (Davis and Greve, 1997).
Allowing as little social mobility as possible is achieved through the homosocial repro-
duction in the elite. This line of argumentation follows Bourdieu’s theory of the repro-
duction of social class structures, according to which class-speciﬁc habitus stabilizes
social structures (Hartmann, 2000). Thus, elite exclusivity can be seen as the
institutional-level equivalent of homophilous behaviour based on status (Chen et al.,
2008; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987). However, whereas status (or prestige) is a
situation-speciﬁc attribute (Gray and Kish-Gephart, 2013) that describes an individual’s
role in the business context, the reproduction of the social class represents an exogenous
process at the country level that nevertheless can have a moderating effect on ﬁrm-level
outcomes, such as the relationship between prestigious directors and ﬁrm performance.
We argue that in institutional contexts where social class reproduction is prevalent
the elite-favouring behaviour of prestigious directors is facilitated because the directors
can be assured that information regarding their behaviour will not easily leak out of the
elite circle. In such an institutional context, directors know that the individuals whom
they meet in similar hierarchical positions, more speciﬁcally in the boardroom, come
from a similar social class background (Gray and Kish-Gephart, 2013), which tends to
lead to a favourable view of each other based on homophily. Such an interpersonal rela-
tionship can easily generate a common normative understanding of business practices
(Davis and Greve, 1997) and facilitate the behaviour in favour of the elite. This also
ampliﬁes homogeneity or a lack of diversity among the elite members, which can lead to
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less innovative decisions. Some of such behaviour can be detrimental to the interests of
a ﬁrm and its shareholders. Prestigious directors may simply ignore their monitoring
responsibility since they have a cordial relationship with the CEO due to their shared
social background. They may also support business practices that advance the CEO’s
and their own interests, as they can prioritize in-group members’ interests more than
out-group members’ due to the low risk of being detected. Those directors may simply
conform to the view of the elite members because they perceive issues from a similar
viewpoint. When the elite exclusivity leads to such behaviour that ignores the interests
of other stakeholders, it will likely negatively moderate the effect of prestigious directors
on ﬁrm performance.
However, the elite members in an institutional environment with greater elite exclu-
sivity may need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders and the public since
there are sometimes tensions between exclusivity and legitimacy (Ashley et al., 2015;
Powell, 1988). To retain exclusivity, the elite members need to limit mobility between
social classes, and yet they may also have to get others in society to accept, at least to
some extent, that this distinction as legitimate. At the macro level, for example, Yue and
colleagues (2013) show that the failure of the banking industry in New York through the
elite’s attempt to privately regulate the industry led to a loss in legitimacy, harming the
elite’s interests. At the ﬁrm level, those directors may face pressure to show their value in
contributing to the goals of the ﬁrm, of which ﬁnancial performance is critical to remain-
ing legitimate in the eyes of investors.
However, being exclusive implies that people in the general public do not have much
information about how those members who belong to this exclusive circle behave and
hence, those elite members may not feel much pressure to show legitimacy. After all, as
such elite circle is an informal group where members are not necessarily selected based
on their ability to contribute to ﬁrm performance, its members may not feel much pres-
sure to justify their exclusiveness. Therefore, our last hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The exclusiveness of the corporate elite has a negative effect on the
relationship between prestigious boards and ﬁrm performance.
METHODS
Sample and Data Sources
The sample includes all ﬁrms listed in the S&P500 and FTSE350 as well as all listed
ﬁrms from 13 continental European countries included in the BoardEx database
between 2005 and 2014. This time frame has the advantage that it includes times of
economic upswing until 2007 as well as the economic downswing due to the ﬁnancial
crisis. Thus, the time frame represents a complete economic cycle, and hence it enhan-
ces the generalizability of our results. In total, it encompasses 1918 ﬁrms from 15 coun-
tries: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. We chose
those European countries because they had at least one company included in the MSCI
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Europe index in our time frame. We excluded Austria due to limited data availability in
the BoardEx database for the years 2005 and 2006 and Portugal due to limited data
availability in 2013 and 2014. We restricted the sample to the S&P500 and FTSE350
because in the USA and the UK – in contrast to the other countries in our sample –
very small ﬁrms are publicly listed; therefore, including all of them in the sample would
create a sample selection bias in general, as well as a large country bias in the modera-
tion analyses. Further, we excluded ﬁnancial services ﬁrms due to their speciﬁc balance
sheet structure. The ﬁrm-level data were collected from Worldscope. The individual-
level information on board members was obtained from BoardEx. For greater compara-
bility across the different corporate governance systems in our sample, and due to our
study’s focus on the supervisory function of the board, we excluded all executive board
members[2] and employee representatives on the board. We used BoardEx data from
2001 to 2014 because the prestige measure takes into account a 5-year experience of
every director (e.g., prestigious directors in 2005 were calculated based on individual
director information from 2001 to 2005, and prestigious directors in 2014 were based
on director information from 2010 to 2014).
We started with a sample of 3136 publicly listed ﬁrms in the BoardEx database, with
at least 2 ﬁrm years available in our time frame from 2005 to 2014. After excluding
ﬁnancial companies, 2447 ﬁrms were left. Further observations were dropped due to
lagging variables and because we applied list-wise deletion when at least one variable
was not available. Consequently, we ended up with 13,185 ﬁrm years in 1918 compa-
nies for our analysis.
Measures
Prestigious directors. A measure for prestigious directors is not easy to build across different
countries with speciﬁc cultures and corporate governance systems. As we have argued
above, prestigious directors have speciﬁc effects on organizational outcomes since they
represent a special subgroup among the supervisory directors in a country. Generally,
prestige can arise out of different areas. Acharya and Pollock (2013) identify a degree
from an elite educational institution, experience as an executive at an S&P500 ﬁrm, and
experience as a supervisory director at an S&P500 ﬁrm for their analysis of US compa-
nies. Since we are investigating elites in different countries, these measures cannot easily
be used for cross-country comparisons. For a multi-country analysis, it is not possible to
identify comparable elitist educational structures. While countries like the S or France
have a distinguished group of elitist universities with prestigious names, for most other
countries in our sample the best education can be found in many different universities,
and there is no such clear prestige for having graduated from a speciﬁc institution. Addi-
tionally, in other countries such as the UK elite education is not limited to the university
level but starts earlier with elitist boarding schools. Hence, in a multi-country study it is
hard to capture elite education with a comparable measure. We therefore did not
include such a measure to capture prestige, focusing instead on the prestige that individ-
uals accumulate during their working life and excluding educational prestige from our
measure.
11When Elites Forget Their Duties
VC 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
Focusing on their professional background, we operationalize the construct of prestig-
ious directors on the board by identifying those directors with the highest cumulative
inﬂuence. We refrain from basing our measure on the membership in a stock index since
these indices are heterogeneous in size and relevance across the countries in our sample.
Instead, we measure this cumulative inﬂuence by aggregating the logarithm of the mar-
ket value of the ﬁrms in the respective country (cross-country directorships are extremely
rare and are neglected without causing much error) in which a director has held a
board-level position (executive and supervisory) in the past ﬁve years (as explained
above, for board prestige in 2005, e.g., we used director positions from 2001 to 2005;
for the 2014 measure, we used 2010 to 2014 positions). In doing this, we obtain a
ranked list for all directors (persons, not positions) that hold a directorship in at least one
company of our sample in a speciﬁc year. To do so, we had to merge BoardEx data
with the ﬁnancial ﬁrm-level data from Worldscope. Directors without directorships with
the market value available on Worldscope were excluded from the ranking. The com-
pany and director sample available through the BoardEx database for the years 2005 to
2014 covers an average of 89 per cent of the market capitalization of all listed compa-
nies in the sample countries (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2012), with mostly small compa-
nies absent. Therefore, we conclude that the dataset is appropriate for the
operationalization of our constructs. To construct the ﬁnal measure for the regression
analysis comparable across countries, we identify the top tercile (results are robust using
the top quartile instead – for more details, see the robustness section) of the directors on
the resulting list as prestigious because we assume that these directors represent the most
inﬂuential and therefore most prestigious individuals in the group of supervisory direc-
tors in a country. The company-level variable used in the regression analysis is the per-
centage of such identiﬁed prestigious directors on the board.
Institutional elite characteristics. We test the contingency effect of the two institutional elite
characteristics: cohesion and exclusiveness. For elite cohesion, we refer to the network
of directors who occupy board positions in multiple companies. The cohesion of a
country’s corporate elite network is approximated by the concentration of this net-
work. To capture this concentration, we measure the density of country’s corporate
elite network. We measure this by counting all existing ties in the network and nor-
malizing this number by dividing the resulting value by the number of all possible ties
in the network (the number of all possible ties equals (n-1)*(n-2)/2). To use the vari-
able in our panel data design, we must make the variables comparable across years.
Hence, we standardize the resulting values to a [0, 1] interval, where 0 represents the
lowest and 1 the highest density in a speciﬁc year. This means that the value 0 for
Italy indicates that Italy is the country with the least coherent network, whereas the
value of 1 for Ireland indicates the highest cohesion. One concern with this approach
is that the density measures are not necessarily comparable between countries since
the number of possible ties increases with the square of the number of nodes, while
likely assumptions for the number of actual ties in the network would assume more or
less linear growth with network size. To address this concern, we used subsamples of
the 40 largest companies by market value for each country to calculate the density
measures on roughly the same network size, thereby accounting for the limited
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number of companies in the smaller countries, while simultaneously maximizing the
representativeness of the sample. However, for robustness, we also estimated our
models with alternative subsample sizes (35 and 45 companies). The ﬁnal (standar-
dized) ELITE COHESION values for the different countries as well as unstandardized val-
ues are displayed in Tables Ia and b.
Table Ia. Elite cohesion measure (standardized)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium 0.26 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.14
Switzerland 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.15
Germany 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00
Denmark 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.40
Spain 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.35 0.44 0.19
Finland 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.35
France 0.64 0.78 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.84 1.00 0.65 0.44
Greece 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.24 0.44
Ireland 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Italy 0.50 0.44 0.48 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.30 0.62 0.45 0.00
Netherlands 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.28
Norway 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.15
Sweden 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.89 0.88 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.64 0.62
United Kingdom 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.36 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.38
United States 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.33 0.28 0.25
Notes: Elite cohesion measures (standardized) for the countries in our sample.
Table Ib. Elite cohesion measure (unstandardized)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Switzerland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Germany 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.05
Denmark 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Spain 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02
Finland 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
France 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.03
Greece 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Ireland 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Italy 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.01
Netherlands 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Norway 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sweden 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04
United Kingdom 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
United States 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Notes: Elite cohesion measures (unstandardized) for the countries in our sample.
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To quantify the exclusiveness of the corporate elite circle in a country, we measured
the permeability of the elite circle. To do this, we used the list of prestigious directors as
described above and calculated for each country the percentage of directors in the elite
group that were already in the elite the year before. This value measures how difﬁcult it
is for new individuals to join the elite and therefore the exclusiveness of the elite circle.
The measure is standardized in the same way as elite cohesion. The ﬁnal ELITE EXCLU-
SIVENESS values for the different countries as well as unstandardized values are displayed
in Tables IIa and b. As a robustness test for this measure, we used a social mobility indi-
cator from the OECD. This intergenerational social mobility measure from the OECD
‘Education at a Glance’ study represents the participation in higher education of stu-
dents whose parents have low levels of education (OECD, 2012). The inverse of this
measure is a proxy for elite exclusiveness because it reveals the degree of change in the
composition of the upper social classes in a more general way at the level of society.
Measurement of Performance and Control Variables
Measures of ﬁrm performance. In our analysis, we focus on ﬁrm operating performance,
which is approximated by the return on assets (ROA). We calculate ROA as earnings
before interest and tax, divided by total ﬁrm assets. This measurement has been used
previously for multi-country analyses since it is not inﬂuenced by a country’s tax regime
or a ﬁrm’s capital structure (Crossland and Chen, 2013; Defond and Hung, 2004). Since
our sample is based on the years 2005 to 2014 and follows a panel data design, we used
the performance measure for the respective years from 2005 to 2014.
Board characteristics. We controlled for board characteristics in our analysis. BOARD SIZE is
measured as the number of supervisory directors on a board. For reasons of comparability
Table IIa. Elite exclusive measure (standardized)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium 0.81 0.76 0.64 0.18 0.54 1.00 0.18 0.19 0.51 0.26
Switzerland 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.22 0.54 0.00 0.32 0.68 0.15 0.66
Germany 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.60 0.50 0.73 0.91
Denmark 0.54 0.62 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.90
Spain 0.71 0.60 0.79 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.30 0.39 0.19 0.40
Finland 0.00 0.62 0.69 0.96 0.88 0.46 0.69 0.74 0.92 0.86
France 0.55 0.00 0.62 0.12 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.39 0.20 0.48
Greece 0.70 0.96 0.00 0.09 0.32 0.70 0.50 0.64 0.26 0.67
Ireland 0.99 1.00 0.88 0.47 0.04 0.64 0.65 0.35 0.59 0.37
Italy 0.65 0.67 0.30 0.43 0.42 0.35 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.70 0.39 0.57 0.25 0.27 0.15 0.43 0.39 0.51 0.68
Norway 0.85 0.87 0.63 0.04 0.34 0.03 0.17 0.35 0.09 0.01
Sweden 0.95 0.65 0.84 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.52 0.27 0.45 0.62
United Kingdom 0.82 0.72 0.63 0.67 0.46 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.44 1.00
United States 0.81 0.74 0.63 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.36
Notes: Elite exclusive measures (standardized) for the countries in our sample.
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between countries, we excluded employee representatives from this measure. We con-
trolled for the PERCENTAGE OF OUTSIDE directors as an independence measure applicable to
multi-country analyses. Outside board members are hereby deﬁned as board members
who did not work for the company before their appointment to the supervisory role.
FEMALE DIRECTORS is deﬁned as the percentage of women among the board members and
used as a control for effects of board gender diversity. CEO TIR (time in role) is deﬁned as
the time that the CEO has been working as the chief executive of the company. Further-
more, we controlled for CEO PRESTIGE, which we measured in line with the prestigious
director measure as a logarithm of the aggregated market value of CEOs’ board-level posi-
tion (executive and supervisory) in the past ﬁve years. The variable BUSYNESS controls for
the downside effects of multiple directorates that have been shown to affect business per-
formance when too many board members are limited in the time available for their super-
visory function (Boivie et al., 2012). Consistent with prior studies, we deﬁne this as the
percentage of directors with three or more directorates (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).
Measures of ownership structures. We controlled for the effects of different ownership struc-
tures in terms of the inﬂuence of institutional investors and the effect of large blockhold-
ers in general. The variable INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS measures the number of large
institutional owners. We hereby count investors as large when they hold more than ten
percent of a company’s shares. The variable PERCENTAGE LARGE OWNERS indicates the
percentage of shares held by the ten largest owners in a company.
Firm characteristics. Several ﬁrm characteristics serve as additional control variables in our
analysis. We controlled for effects of prior ﬁrm performance using ROA lagged by one
year. To control for the different outcomes of ﬁrms of different sizes, we include FIRM
Table IIb. Elite exclusive measure (unstandardized)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.42
Switzerland 0.79 0.77 0.81 0.73 0.79 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.65 0.59
Germany 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.70
Denmark 0.66 0.72 0.81 0.85 0.90 0.77 0.71 0.81 0.83 0.69
Spain 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.48
Finland 0.48 0.72 0.73 0.84 0.87 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.67
France 0.67 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.65 0.73 0.81 0.70 0.66 0.52
Greece 0.72 0.78 0.55 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.72 0.75 0.68 0.59
Ireland 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.77 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.47
Italy 0.70 0.73 0.63 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.32
Netherlands 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.60
Norway 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.32
Sweden 0.80 0.73 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.58
United Kingdom 0.76 0.74 0.72 0.80 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.73
United States 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.47
Notes: Elite exclusive measures (unstandardized) for the countries in our sample.
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SIZE as the natural logarithm of a ﬁrm’s total assets. The variable FIRM RISK is the stand-
ard deviation of the return on equity in the past three years, divided by the mean return
on equity in the past three years. This controls for the volatility in a ﬁrm’s performance
outcomes. SALES CHANGE measures the difference in total sales over one year and con-
trols for disruptions in ﬁrm output inﬂuencing company performance. To control for
different ﬁnancial structures, we include LEVERAGE, calculated as the ratio of long-term
debt to total capital. We accounted for ﬁrm DIVERSIFICATION with an entropy measure
as suggested, for example, by Palepu (1985). It is measured as
P
pijln 1=pij
 
, where pij
is the proportion of a ﬁrm i’s sales in business segment j and ln 1=pij
 
is the weight of
each segment j. This measure controls for the effects of a company’s scope on its per-
formance. Additionally, we controlled for ﬁrm prestige using a dummy variable that
indicates whether the ﬁrm was listed in the prestigious indices S&P100 or MSCI Europe
for the respective year.
To incorporate industry effects within our regression models, we used two-digit SIC
code dummies. Year dummies are included in the estimation to control for year-speciﬁc
effects. Country dummies are included to control for those country effects that are not
captured by the moderator variables. Table III summarizes the descriptive statistics and
pairwise correlations for the variables used in the analysis.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Empirical Strategy
We used a longitudinal dataset for the analysis, spanning the years 2005 to 2014. The
main objective of this study is to analyse the effect of prestigious directors on a ﬁrm’s
performance and the inﬂuence of the institutional setting on this relationship. To exam-
ine this relation empirically, we analysed variants of the following model speciﬁcation:
PERFORMANCE5 f(average number of prestigious directors, moderators, interaction
terms, board controls, ownership controls, and ﬁrm controls)
Our data depict a ‘small T, large N’ situation with few time periods and many ﬁrms
for which we assume the presence of ﬁxed effects as well as heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation within ﬁrms, but not across them. Additionally, the dependent vari-
able and some independent variables are not strictly exogenous; they are correlated
with past and possibly current realizations of the error term. Including such variables
in a standard ﬁxed-effects equation is problematic due to the high probability that the
error term will be correlated with the lagged endogenous variable. Consequently, we
adopted the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998) for our analysis. This approach has recently been used in
several studies with comparable research designs (Cheng et al., 2014; He and Huang,
2011; Wade et al., 2006). For our estimations, we employed the xtabond2 module in
Stata 14 (Roodman, 2009).
The GMM estimator reduces potential problems regarding endogeneity as it is based
on instrumental variables estimation using the lags of the variables as estimators, simul-
taneously allowing the use of the lags of the dependent variable (Roodman, 2009). Addi-
tionally, it controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity using orthogonal conditions and
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provides better estimates in the presence of autocorrelation, as compared to ﬁxed effects
models. We used a two-step system GMM estimator because one-step estimators may
produce biased estimates when variables vary little over time (Arellano and Bover,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). We applied Windmeijer-corrected standard errors to
control for downward bias in the estimator (Windmeijer, 2005).
Additionally, we report diagnostic tests to conﬁrm estimation validity. The Arellano–
Bond test (AB-test) for the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of disturbances should indicate sig-
niﬁcant ﬁrst-order serial correlation from GMM’s ﬁrst-differenced estimation (Arellano
and Bond, 1991). The second order test should be free of autocorrelation and give a
non-signiﬁcant result. A chi-square test checks potential model misspeciﬁcation and con-
ﬁrms the model’s explanatory power (Hair et al., 2006). The Sargan/Hansen test for
over-identifying restrictions tests for the independence of the instruments from the error
term. We provide Hansen’s J statistics instead of the Sargan test because the Sargan sta-
tistic can become inconsistent with the use of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors
(Roodman, 2009). In all our models, the results suggest that the model is well-ﬁtted (chi-
square< 0.001) and appropriate for use with system GMM (signiﬁcant ﬁrst-order AB-
test and non-signiﬁcant second order AB-test and Hansen’s J statistic).
Empirical Results
Table IV provides the regression analysis results on the relationship between the
average number of prestigious directors and ﬁrm performance. The dependent vari-
able is the ROA. Model 1 shows the regression results for the main effect. It includes
all the control variables and the average number of prestigious directors as independ-
ent variables. The inﬂuence of the average number of prestigious directors on ﬁrm
performance is signiﬁcant and positive (p< 0.01), thus supporting Hypothesis 1a but
rejecting Hypothesis 1b. This conﬁrms the general idea that ﬁrms beneﬁt from pres-
tigious directors on their boards; they bring advantages that outweigh the potential
negative effects. The result also suggests that prestigious directors do not engage in
behaviours that beneﬁt themselves at the expense of the interests of the ﬁrm and
shareholders. Our multi-country sample supports the assumption that this is generally
true for different countries.
Model 2 extends the main model with the elite cohesion variable and its interaction
with prestigious directors. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative effect of the cohesion of a
country’s elite on the relationship of prestigious directors and company performance. As
Model 2 shows, the interaction is indeed negative. However, the effect is not signiﬁcant.
Hence, model 2 does not support Hypothesis 2. The negative effect of a cohesive net-
work on the relationship between prestigious directors and ﬁrm performance might be
accompanied by a positive effect as directors with multiple board positions can also
transfer positive business practices with potentially positive effects more efﬁciently in
dense networks. Examples of those positive practices could be a quality control practice
or efﬁcient business process system, from other ﬁrms where they serve as a board mem-
ber in order to support the CEO. Such behaviour can also send a positive signal about
the director within a small elite circle as being a valuable member. Model 3 tests Hypoth-
esis 3 which predicts that a high exclusiveness of countries’ elite circles will decrease the
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positive effects of having prestigious directors on the board. As Model 3 shows, the inter-
action term is indeed negative and signiﬁcant (p< 0.05), supporting Hypothesis 3. Due
to the high correlation of both interaction terms (see Table III), we decided follow the
approach of used in Atanassov and Kim (2009) and estimated regressions with interac-
tion effects separately. The signiﬁcant interaction term is plotted in Figure 1.
Table IV. Regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
% prestigious directors 5.77** (1.82) 4.76* (2.41) 6.03** (1.87)
Elite cohesion 0.65 (1.30)
% prestigious directors * elite cohesion 22.13 (3.16)
Elite exclusiveness 0.33 (0.39)
% prestigious directors *elite exclusiveness 22.66* (1.05)
Board characteristics
Board size 22.47 (1.99) 21.37 (2.00) 20.58 (2.04)
Busyness 20.14 (1.24) 0.44 (1.26) 21.51 (1.81)
% outsider 1.96 (2.40) 3.97 (2.44) 1.25 (2.41)
Female directors 2.77 (2.98) 4.75 (3.04) 2.54 (2.95)
CEO Duality 0.21 (1.12) 1.30 (1.08) 1.17 (1.05)
CEO TIR 20.08 (0.07) 20.09 (0.07) 20.03 (0.07)
CEO prestige 20.15** (0.06) 20.06 (0.06) 20.09 (0.06)
Ownership characteristics
Blockholder 22.39 (3.22) 23.14 (3.45) 20.38 (3.32)
Institutional invt 20.37 (0.75) 20.36 (0.80) 21.18 (0.80)
Firm characteristics
ROAt21 0.55*** (0.05) 0.60*** (0.05) 0.49*** (0.05)
Size 21.01 (0.71) 20.72 (0.58) 20.84 (0.68)
Company prestige 0.45 (0.49) 0.16 (0.51) 0.30 (0.50)
Leverage 9.39* (4.35) 15.94*** (4.69) 9.22* (4.33)
Diversiﬁcation 20.75 (0.99) 20.89 (1.02) 20.04 (0.98)
Risk 20.44 (0.33) 20.39 (0.36) 20.57† (0.34)
Salesgrowth 6.53*** (1.77) 3.95* (1.95) 4.91* (2.07)
Constant 65.70* (31.01) 35.12 (31.33) 56.31* (28.55)
Industrydummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. ofobservations 13,185 13,185 13,185
Model ﬁt
Wald v2-statistica 956.72 (53) 931.42 (55) 950.10 (55)
Arellano–Bond test (P1)b 210.38 [0.0] 210.01 [0.00] 29.58 [0.00]
Arellano–Bond test (P2)b 1.56 [0.12] 1.61 [0.11] 1.28 [0.20]
Hansen J-statisticb 76.54 [0.31] 54.76 [0.56] 58.05 [0.20]
aDegrees of freedom in parentheses.
bz-values are reported with signiﬁcance levels in brackets.
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.1, system GMM estimation.
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Following Shaver (2008), who claims that ‘concluding that an effect is non-zero is dif-
ferent from concluding that an effect is meaningful’ (Shaver, 2008, p. 187), we also had
a look at the economic signiﬁcance of the performance effect of prestigious directors.
Following previous research (Masulis et al., 2007), we calculated the change in the
dependent variable when the independent variable changes by one standard deviation
(SD). As model 3 indicates, the coefﬁcient of prestigious directors is 6.03. Hence, a one
SD change in prestigious directors results in a performance increase of 2.23.
Robustness Tests
To address the concern that the volatility of the exclusiveness moderator across time
might have undesired effects on our results, we decided to additionally approximate elite
exclusiveness by the time-invariant measure of social immobility. Hence, as a robustness
test for the exclusiveness moderator, we used the social immobility measure of the
OECD described earlier. We ﬁnd support (p< 0.05) for the hypothesized direction of
Hypothesis 3 in Model 4 (Table V). Another possible concern is the validity of the speci-
ﬁcation of our prestige and elite measures. To check for the sensitivity of our results
regarding the chosen thresholds, and to check for the possible overestimation of the sig-
niﬁcance due to artifacts in the data, we recalculated our model with changes in the
variable speciﬁcation. As described above, prestigious directors are identiﬁed using the
top tercile of the ranked list of the directors in a country. Model 5 (Table V) represents
the results using the top quartile. Models 6 and 7 (Table VI) show the estimations for
the exclusiveness measure with a threshold of 35 ﬁrms and 45 ﬁrms. Estimations for the
cohesiveness measure with the same respective thresholds are not displayed in the study.
The interaction effect of elite cohesion remains insigniﬁcant with these changes
thresholds.
In further tests, we challenged the robustness of our results with respect to differences
between one-tier and two-tier board systems (for details about potential differences
between these board systems see e.g., Heyden et al., 2015). Controlling for the differen-
ces in country-level board systems does not change our results.
Figure 1. Interaction effects for elite exclusiveness
Notes: Low and high levels for the moderator imply values of one standard deviation below and above
the mean.
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To account for potential issues of endogeneity and reverse causality, we ﬁrst repli-
cated our results employing country-level elite adjusted measures of board prestige
(prestigious directors adjusted is the residual of an OLS regression of prestigious direc-
tors explained by elite cohesion and elite exclusiveness). We were able to replicate our
results using this adjusted prestige measure. Second, we calculated reverse logit regres-
sions explaining the growth of boards and the substitution of less prestigious directors
with more prestigious directors to contend that ﬁrms with high performance do not
attract more and more prestigious directors. To save space, the robustness results are
not presented in the paper.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study sheds new light on the performance effects of prestigious directors. By intro-
ducing the institutional level factors to research on the effects of prestigious directors,
our study contributes to further disentangling the cost and beneﬁts of prestigious direc-
tors. We have shown that prestigious directors on boards may bring both beneﬁts and
costs to ﬁrms. While our result indicates that prestigious directors generally contribute
to ﬁrm performance, costs of such directors emerge under some institutional conditions.
These costs, due to the elite-favouring behaviour of prestigious directors, likely occur
especially in countries with high levels of elite efﬁcacy. To comprehensively depict elite
Table V. Regression results – robustness
Model 4 Model 5
Dependent variable ROA ROA
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
% prestigious directors 4.37** (1.62)
Social upward immobility 2126.51 (161.90)
% prestigious directors *social upward immobility 231.30† (17.77)
% prestigious directors (quartile cut off) 6.15** (2.26)
Board characteristics Yes Yes
Ownership characteristics Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
Industrydummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
No. of observations 13,185 13,185
Model ﬁt
Wald v2-statistica 1111.41 (50) 621.70 (53)
Arellano–Bond test (P1)b 210.14 [0.0] 29.40 [0.00]
Arellano–Bond test (P2)b 1.52 [0.13] 1.01 [0.31]
Hansen J-statisticb 60.51 [0.49] 38.96 [0.87]
aDegrees of freedom in parentheses.
bz-values are reported with signiﬁcance levels in brackets.
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.1, system GMM estimation.
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efﬁcacy, we developed the institutional variables of elite cohesion and elite exclusiveness
as important contingencies that affect the performance implications of prestigious direc-
tors. We have shown empirically that both dimensions of elite efﬁcacy reduce the posi-
tive performance effects of prestigious directors, however, only the effect of elite
exclusiveness is signiﬁcant. By doing so, our study makes several contributions and sug-
gests a future research avenue, as we discuss below.
Research on Elites
Our study offers implications for research on elites and their role in the corporate world.
We have shown that the societal effects of elite-favouring behaviour can affect economic
outcomes at the ﬁrm level. Hence, we combine the macro-level perspective of societal
elite characteristics with the micro-level effects of corporate actors such as board mem-
bers on ﬁrm level outcomes. This integration of the micro and macro perspectives on
elites adds to research on the role of elites in corporate governance research (Davis
et al., 2003; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). While previous research pointed out the relevance
of characteristics of elites on individual (Jensen and Zajac, 2004) and company level
behaviour (Hage and Dewar, 1973), our study demonstrates the importance of also con-
sidering elite structures at the country or institutional level. The institutional characteris-
tics of elites thus deserve closer attention in the management research. With elite
Table VI. Regression results—robustness
Model 6 Model 7
Dependent variable ROA ROA
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
% prestigious directors 5.81** (1.78) 5.89** (1.86)
Elite excl. (35 ﬁrms) 20.09
% prestigious directors * elite excl. (35 ﬁrms) 22.56** (0.41)
Elite excl. (45 ﬁrms) (0.85) 0.24 (0.39)
% prestigious directors * elite excl. (45 ﬁrms) 23.11** (1.02)
Board characteristics Yes Yes
Ownership characteristics Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
Industrydummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
No. ofobservations 13,185 13,185
Model ﬁt
Wald v2-statistica 979.61 (55) 942.56 (55)
Arellano–Bond test (P1)b 212.88 [0.0] 29.51 [0.0]
Arellano–Bond test (P2)b 1.07 [0.28] 1.29 [0.20]
Hansen J-statisticb 56.91 [0.18] 57.05 [0.23]
aDegrees of freedom in parentheses.
bz-values are reported with signiﬁcance levels in brackets.
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.1, system GMM estimation.
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cohesion and elite exclusiveness, we introduce a framework that describes elite efﬁcacy
at the institutional level. This framework can be applied in a broad range of corporate
governance studies. Future research might, for instance, seek to investigate the effects of
elites on the likelihood of CEO dismissals or managerial compensation in different insti-
tutional contexts with unique elite structures.
Prestigious Directors
Mixed research evidence exists concerning potential effects of prestigious directors.
Whereas some studies have found positive effects of prestigious directors (Certo et al.,
2001; Pollock et al., 2010), recent research has highlighted the costs of prestigious direc-
tors (Acharya and Pollock, 2013). We built on these studies and attempted to identify
conditions under which costs of prestige may be ampliﬁed or when costs outweigh the
beneﬁts of the rich capital of prestigious directors and of the positive signalling effect,
thereby damaging ﬁrm performance. These thoughts are in line with the stream of liter-
ature that observed that social ties bring directors to bargain executive compensation
contracts less strictly (Hwang and Kim, 2009) and to be less likely to dismiss low per-
forming CEOs (Nguyen, 2012). Our study adds to this line of research, as the negative
effect of the elite moderators generates a clearer picture of the underlying effects of the
potential costs of prestigious directors. The negative effects of our institutional modera-
tors provide empirical support for the existence of costs of prestigious directors.
With elite-favouring behaviour, we also model a potential cost dimension of prestigi-
ous directors in more detail. Our study demonstrates that researchers recommending
the appointment of prestigious directors for the reasons of positive signalling (e.g., Certo
et al., 2001) or rich director capital could extend their models by also considering poten-
tial cost that can occur due to elite-favouring behaviour. Our results may not only hold
for the board context but also provide interesting insights for the effects of prestige and
status in general. For instance, researchers that primarily focus on the prestige of other
corporate actors such as TMT members (e.g., D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993; Lester et al.,
2006) might want to apply our results to their context to challenge the idea of exclusively
positive effects of prestigious managers. Their high status might lead prestigious manag-
ers to be easily infected by managerial hubris, which can raise costs for the respective
company. From a more general perspective, our study follows the call for more research
not only considering beneﬁts of prestige-based status but also taking potential downsides
into account (Chen et al., 2012).
Research on Comparative Institutions
Our results also demonstrate the importance of considering the institutional environ-
ment when investigating the effects of prestigious directors. Speciﬁcally, our study adds
to the literature that emphasizes the value of multi-country studies for gaining insights
on the effects of corporate governance characteristics (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Boyd
et al., 2011; Filatotchev et al., 2013; H€uttenbrink et al., 2014; Oehmichen et al.,
2017b). While we acknowledge that governance systems may vary across national con-
texts based on different legislation, cultural traditions, and stakeholder considerations
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), we aim to contribute to the literature by going beyond the
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usual classiﬁcations of formal and informal institutions that describe a country’s institu-
tional environment. This study shows that speciﬁc institutional dimensions can be (and
should be) selected and developed for the speciﬁc research questions (i.e., upsides and
downsides of prestigious directors in this study). Since we were interested in the potential
beneﬁts and costs of elite-favouring behaviour, we constructed a framework of the elite
that was based on institutional factors. With these speciﬁc variables depicting country-
level elite structures, we add to research on the country-level effects of social capital.
A study by Burt and his colleagues (2000) indicates that country-level differences with
respect to social capital effects exist, but their two-country research design does not
allow researchers to specify the country-level effects and distinguish them from other for-
mal and informal institutional characteristics. Extending this two-country approach to a
multi-country study allows us to distinguish country-level effects more speciﬁcally.
Future research might want to follow our strategy to develop case-speciﬁc institutional
dimensions. For instance, research on the potential of stakeholder-favouring behaviour
might need to develop speciﬁc institutional frameworks describing the institutional stake-
holder orientation based on formal and informal institutional factors. By modelling insti-
tutional environments in this manner, researchers can clearly extend the institutional
research that has primarily focused on established classiﬁcations of regulative, norma-
tive, and cognitive institutions.
Limitations and Future Research
As in other studies, our research is not without limitations. First, our study does not
examine the underlying board mechanisms that actually contribute to or damage ﬁrm
performance. Future studies might want to add to our research by questioning how the
institutional elite efﬁcacy inﬂuences effects of prestigious boards on outcomes of speciﬁc
board tasks such as monitoring the CEO (Kroll et al., 2008) or providing strategic coun-
sel (Oehmichen et al., 2017b; Pugliese et al., 2009), which in turn impacts ﬁrm perform-
ance. Additionally, these studies may want to further challenge behavioural
consequences of director prestige. Potential questions might be whether director prestige
increases the number of lawsuits against elitist behaviour and which speciﬁc deviations
from the norm we can observe in ﬁrms with prestigious directors.
Second, we looked at elites at the country level. With this simpliﬁcation, we indirectly
presumed one elite group per country and that the institutional variables that depict the
elite structures do not change between different regions within each country but are
rather homogeneous across all regions of a country. This is a simpliﬁcation from which
most studies concerning institutional or cultural differences suffer (Kirkman et al.,
2006), although researchers have indicated the importance of within-country differences
(McSweeney, 2002). Therefore, future research could consider within-country differen-
ces in a country’s elite structures, for example, by opposing East- and West-Coast elites
in the USA or speciﬁc elites of metropolitan areas, such as the region around Frankfurt
in Germany or Paris in France. We would expect to see an increase in the effect of elite
moderators due to the higher cohesiveness of the networks in these regions.
Third, although we theorized the effects of social interaction between the members of
the elite, we were not able to measure these interactions. Thus, future research might
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further open up the black box of social interaction and friendship ties between the mem-
bers of the countries’ elites, although previous research indicates that to truly measure
this interaction, survey data is required (Westphal and Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal
et al., 2006). For the multi-country focus that our research requires, this would be a
challenging endeavour. Furthermore, the multi-country setting of our study did not
allow us the use of in-depth prestige measures and the investigation of in-depth group
behaviour effects in boards with prestigious directors. Future single-country studies,
however, could address this point. In-depth studies could examine whether different
sources of prestige (e.g., corporate vs. educational) have different effects on director per-
formance, if these sources of prestige rather substitute or complement each other, and if
these sources of prestige result in different group dynamics, such as decreasing group
effectiveness as a result of too many prestigious directors (Groysberg et al., 2011), infor-
mal hierarchies in the group of directors (He and Huang, 2011), differences in board
members participation in boardroom discussions (Pugliese et al., 2015) and group polar-
ization (Zhu, 2013).
Lastly, our study focused on Europe and the USA – both Western industrial market
countries. Hence, we ignored potential institutional effects prevalent in Asian countries
or in emerging markets. These regions might be fruitful future research extensions
because Asian countries differ from Western countries in terms of several institutional
and cultural dimensions. Emerging markets would additionally allow for modelling the
effects of institutional change since most of these countries are in a period of transition.
This transition might also affect the formation and structure of the countries’ elites.
Hence, we hope that our study encourages future research reconsider our elite measures
in different institutional settings and thereby also help to extend reliability of our con-
ceptualization of country-level elites.
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NOTES
[1] Some studies have used the term status instead of prestige, and have examined the effects of high status
afﬁliation, instead of referring to prestigious afﬁliations (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). While we
included these studies in our theoretical framework, we followed the approach of Acharya and Pollock
(2013) which considers prestige and status as synonyms, and used the term ‘prestige’. To assure the com-
parability of prestige between the different countries in our sample, we concentrated on directorates as a
source of prestige.
[2] Conceptually, the exclusion of executive board members enhances the comparability of the countries in
our sample (in Europe, one- and two-tier board systems are prevalent (Heyden et al., 2015; Thomsen
and Conyon, 2012)) and the focus on non-executives more strongly connects our measure to our theoreti-
cal reasoning. We suggest that prestigious directors may potentially neglect their monitoring duties.
These monitoring duties are primarily the task of non-executive board members.
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